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The first publication in the LSEE Papers series, Tim Judah’s stimulating paper on the 
emergence of increased cooperation and links across the former Yugoslavia, initiated 
a lively debate in the region itself and also further abroad. Keen to maintain this 
momentum with the second issue we are delighted to present Kenneth Morrison’s 
in-depth analysis of Montenegro in the five years since its independence. Kenneth 
Morrison is the author of Montenegro: A Modern History and is an unrivalled expert 
on the country and the wider region in which it is situated. His Paper offers an insight 
into Montenegro’s path to independence in 2006 as well as the adjustments of the 
political landscape that followed.
The LSEE Papers are intended to provide a series of provocative and timely Papers 
to complement core LSEE activities such as academic research and public events. As 
part of our commitment to quality and impact we will commission contributions 
from eminent commentators and policy-makers on the significant issues of the day 
pertaining to an ever-important region of Europe.
Dr Spyros Economides

1Introduction: 
Setting the context 
On 21 May 2006, an independence referendum was held in Montenegro to determine 
whether the republic would remain a partner within the state union of Serbia & 
Montenegro (Srbija i Crna Gora – SCG) or become an independent state. Following a 
closely contested campaign, brokered by the European Union (EU), a narrow majority 
(55.5%) of the republic’s citizens opted for the latter, heralding Montenegro’s re-emergence 
as a sovereign state. Independence was formally declared on 5 June 2006 and thus the 
issue of the republic’s status, which had dominated Montenegrin politics and discourse 
since 1997 (but most acutely since the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in March 
2003), was resolved. But with independence came responsibility and new uncertainties, 
and the challenges presented by independence were no longer abstract. The Montenegrin 
government could no longer blame all their ills on political instability in Serbia, and they 
could no longer argue that they were inhibited from charting a genuinely independent 
course as a result of being tied to Serbia in an asymmetric federation (or union).1
While Montenegro’s status had fundamentally changed, the rhetoric that had 
characterised the period between 1997 and 2006 (but was most pronounced between 
2003 and 2006) continued unabated despite the new reality. The issue of status may 
have been formally resolved, but many of the antagonisms between the parties which 
comprised the competing pre-referendum blocs continued into the post-independence 
period; these being particularly manifest during constitutional debates throughout 
2007. One must bear in mind that the referendum process, though peaceful and 
deemed by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) 
election monitors to be ‘free and fair’, was not entirely bereft of controversy.2 The ‘Yes’ 
and ‘No’ campaigns had been energetically and bitterly fought by the respective blocs, 
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and in the wake of the referendum there had been accusations of voting irregularities 
and coercion. There were political casualties, blood on the carpet; winners and losers; 
joy for the victors, despair for the defeated.
Consequently, the country entered into this new era with a divided body politic, and 
a sense of embitterment among a significant minority (44.5 % of the population 
had voted to retain the joint state, and some within this group did not recognise 
the legitimacy of the result).3 The Serbian analyst, and one-time advisor to Andrija 
Mandić, the President of the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka – SNS) in 
Montenegro, warned in 2007 that “Conflicts over the constitution, the position of the 
church, state symbols and the relationship between the government and the opposition 
represent fertile breeding grounds for new clashes.”4 Not, by any standards, an ideal 
basis for future political stability, yet Montenegro began its life as an independent state 
within this political and social context. 
What, then, of the subsequent years of Montenegro’s independence? Well, despite 
concerns the country was too small to be economically viable, too politically divided 
to be stable, and too institutionally weak to effectively tackle endemic problems 
such as corruption and organised crime, issues that might mitigate their Euro-
Atlantic aspirations (EU & NATO membership), Montenegro has, in spite of its 
evident problems, made impressive progress. As an internationally-recognised state, 
Montenegro became a member of the United Nations (UN) and other international 
institutions; it has consolidated its position among its neighbours, and has made great 
strides toward achieving the government’s core objective – Euro-Atlantic integration. 
In June 2006, the European Union (EU) established relations with Montenegro and 
all member states recognised the country’s independence. Just over a year later, in 
October 2007, Montenegro signed a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA). A 
formal application was submitted in December 2008 and the process of responding 
to the European Commission’s (EC) detailed questionnaire on how the country’s 
legislation conforms to the acquis communautaire (the EU body of law). 
3The EU noted the Montenegrin government’s open and constructive approach.5 That 
the country took such a positive approach was frequently acknowledged by the EU, 
which often touted Montenegro as a beacon of light in a region still beset with residual 
problems emanating from the chaos of the 1990s. These comments were, however, 
relative and framed within the wider context of the Western Balkan accession process, 
and Montenegro benefited from the EU’s need to tell a positive story with regard to 
the Western Balkans, more difficult in the context of, say, Serbia, FYROM, Albania 
or Bosnia & Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the country’s endeavours were rewarded in 
December 2009 when Montenegrin citizens were granted visa-free travel within the 
Schengen zone; an important development because it provided tangible evidence that 
their government’s endeavours were bearing fruit. In November 2010, the EC published 
its avis (opinion) on the country’s bid to become a candidate for membership. In 
December 2010, Montenegro was formally awarded candidate status by the European 
Commission (EC), a significant milestone in the wider accession process. It represented 
the culmination of the significant endeavours of, among others, Montenegro’s Minister 
for European Integration, Gordana Djurović.6
Although there is less domestic consensus, Montenegro has made progress toward 
NATO membership, despite the significant opposition to the participation (from 
March 2010) of Montenegrin troops in an International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) mission in northern Afghanistan (a commitment undertaken to bolster their 
chances of membership). The country became a member of the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) in December 2006, and engaged in ‘membership dialogue’ with NATO 
from April 2008. In December 2009, Montenegro joined the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP), the first objective of which was to submit their first Annual National 
Programme (ANP), which they did in September 2010.7 While NATO membership is 
largely dependent upon reforms in the defence and security sector, NATO Secretary-
General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has reiterated that progress in tackling organised 
crime and corruption is essential for both EU and NATO membership.8
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Domestically, the country seems to have forged more than a semblance of political 
stability. As will be shown, many individuals, parties and institutions that vociferously 
opposed independence appear to have accepted Montenegro’s sovereignty and the 
realities of operating within that framework. And despite the challenges generated 
by both domestic and wider regional problems, among them the emotive issue of 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (and official Podgorica’s recognition 
of it), relations between Montenegro’s ethnic and national groups have remained stable. 
Within the Montenegrin political system there are, of course, residual problems; the most 
acute being the lengthy dominance of the DPS,9 the opaque boundaries between the 
ruling party and the state, and the lack of a credible opposition; although, with regard 
to the latter, there may yet emerge a more effective opposition in the coming years, be it 
through splits within the ruling elite or through the mechanism of democratic elections.
Residual problems remain, yet even cynics would be hard pressed to deny that the 
country has thrived beyond expectations in the first years of independence. Wouldn’t 
they? Well, while acknowledging the aforementioned achievements, they may well 
argue that the ostensible ‘certainties’ of the post-independence period, characterised 
by political stability, rising confidence and rapid economic growth has given way 
to a greater level of uncertainty. At present, EU membership is on the horizon, but 
is not imminent; meeting the EU’s conditions for full membership represents a far 
sterner challenge than those overcome with relative ease thus far. Moreover, the 
external conditions are not favourable – there is, as a consequence largely of the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent flux within the Euro-zone, little appetite for 
further expansion among many EU member states. The path to NATO membership 
is, conversely, more assured but not enthusiastically embraced by the population. The 
country has a new prime minister, Igor Lukšić, who succeeded Milo Djukanović in 
December 2010. He faces many challenges if he is to fulfil Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic 
ambitions. Given the political and economic challenges that lie ahead, there may well 
be as much flux in the second five years of Montenegro’s first decade of independence 
as that which characterised the first.
5In June 2011, Montenegro will have been independent for five years. It seems, then, an 
appropriate time to measure developments since the May 2006 referendum. The aim of 
this paper is to assess this five year period by analysing the key political developments 
since, and how they have shaped Montenegro’s political landscape. Given the limitations 
of a short paper, the focus is intentionally narrow. The following is not intended to be a 
comprehensive analysis of political developments, but, rather, a selective assessment of 
the key events, developments and controversies that have impacted upon Montenegrin 
politics during the past five years. The emphasis is firmly upon the domestic political scene, 
with a particular emphasis on inter and intra-party dynamics. This is contextualised 
within the wider framework of the Euro-Atlantic integration process and, to an extent, 
the economy. Collectively, these factors have characterised Montenegro’s first years of 
independence; five years of change, continuity and consolidation.
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Post-referendum politics: 
Flux and stability
Following the May 2006 referendum and the subsequent declaration of independence, 
the governing Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska partija socijalista – DPS), 
their coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija – SDP) 
and others comprising the ‘Movement for a Sovereign and Independent Montenegro’ 
(Pokret za samostalnu i nezavisnu Crnu Goru) bloc, basked in the glory of their victory. 
In the weeks and months following the declaration of independence, the pages of (pro-
government) press such as Pobjeda trumpeted one achievement after another: from the 
first recognition by an international state (Iceland being the first) to Council of Europe 
and UN membership. With good news to report on a near daily basis, the government 
benefited from a lengthy post-referendum honeymoon. Indeed, the strength of the 
ruling coalition increased; demonstrated by the strong showing at the post-referendum 
parliamentary elections in September 2006.10 The DPS-SDP coalition won 48% of the 
vote, more than three times as many as its closest competitor.
But in the immediate post-referendum period, the respective blocs began to fragment. 
Independence had only increased the sense of marginalisation for those who had 
voted for the preservation of the state union. The majority of those who voted against 
independence defined themselves as Serbs and for them the post-independence period 
was one of disappointment and self-reflection. The pro-union ‘Movement for the 
Joint European State Union of Serbia and Montenegro’ (Pokret za zajedničku evropsku 
državu Srbije i Crne Gore) fragmented after the referendum, and their component 
political parties were weak, demoralised and, in the immediate post referendum period, 
divided.11 Amid the gloom, new shoots emerged, most clearly manifested by the 
creation of the Serb List (Srpska lista – SL), a coalition constructed around the Serbian 
7People’s Party (Srpska narodna stranka – SNS) and led by Andrija Mandić.12 Claiming 
to represent the interests of ‘real’ Serbs in Montenegro, their platform represented 
something of a departure from the approach taken by other Serb parties. They rejected 
the argument that Serbs and Montenegrins were two branches of the wider Serbian 
national corpus, stating that if Montenegrins were to assert an identity bereft of Serb 
political and cultural symbols, their primary objective should be “the protection of the 
constitutionality and full affirmation of the identity and freedom of the Serb people 
[in Montenegro].”13 Their agenda was underpinned by several key demands. Firstly, 
that Serbs should be defined constitutionally as a distinct and equal nation (not as 
a ‘national minority’); Secondly, that Serbs should be represented on a proportional 
basis (in accordance with the 2003 census results – 31.99% of the population) in state 
and local governing bodies; Thirdly, that they should have the right to display Serb 
national symbols; And finally, that there should be a constitutional confirmation of 
Serbian as an official language and the Cyrillic alphabet as an official script.
Undoubtedly a nationalist agenda, but cast as a defensive one, the SL gathered 
momentum as this message was absorbed by Montenegro’s Serbs. They became, 
following the September 2006 election, the strongest opposition party in Montenegro 
with a 15% share of the vote.14 But, of course, their success determined a split within 
the Serb vote. The remaining Serb parties, the Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička 
narodna partija – SNP), the party who had, since the DPS split in 1997, been the 
dominant Serb party, the People’s Party (Narodna stranka – NS)15 and the Democratic 
Serbian Party (Demokratska srpska stranka – DSS), entered into a coalition to contest 
the September 2006 elections. Gaining just 14% of the vote, they were victims of the 
electoral success of the SL.
The ‘Serbian option’ was politically defeated and their political representatives 
divided, but given the residual bitterness that still permeated, it was essential for the 
Montenegrin government that they be seen to accommodate the Montenegrin Serbs. 
Nevertheless, the over-riding perception among Serbs was that the new, independent 
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Montenegro was not their state, but a ‘private state’ controlled by Djukanović, his small 
clique within the DPS and shady businessmen. As a nation, the Serbs were, it was 
argued, at a distinct political and economic disadvantage. After all, the positive effects 
of the economic boom impacted primarily in central and coastal municipalities, those 
controlled by the DPS or SDP. Be it political or practical, the majority of the incoming 
FDI did not find its way to the traditionally-Serb northern municipalities, such as 
Pljevlja, Šavnik, Berane or Andrijevica).16
These northern municipalities were also home to a significant minority of Muslim-
Bosniaks, many of whom had voted for independence. But the referendum had been a 
divisive issue for them, as the separation of Serbia and Montenegro would also render 
the Sandžak, an area that straddles these republics, divided by an international border.17 
The majority of Bosniaks on the Serbian side of the border opposed independence, 
but Bosniaks in Montenegro (the majority of whom had voted for Djukanović’s DPS 
since 1997) supported, in the main, the independence option. For those Montenegrin 
Bosniaks (such as the former Montenegrin SDA leader Harun Hadžić) who did oppose 
independence, they were faced, paradoxically, with having to align themselves with the 
same political forces that had persecuted them in the early 1990s.
The good relations between Montenegro’s Albanians were shaken in the wake of the 
arrest of several members of an alleged Albanian ‘terrorist cell’ located in Malesija, near 
Podgorica. Prior to the September 2006 parliamentary elections (during ‘Operation 
Eagle’s Flight’), Montenegrin police arrested individuals suspected of belonging to a 
terrorist group who, it was claimed, planned to attack key figures in the Montenegrin 
parliament. Criminal charges were pressed against seventeen persons suspected of 
‘criminal acts, terrorism, and illegal possession of arms and explosive materials’ – firearms, 
explosive devices and ammunition were confiscated.18 Cynics, however, suggested that 
the affair had been instrumentalised by state security in order to influence the electorate 
prior to the elections. Although that is unlikely, the subsequent fall-out damaged relations 
between the government and the Albanian community. Albanian leaders, such as Ferhat 
9Dinosha (who, it was alleged, was a target), sought to emphasise that ‘Operation Eagle’s 
Flight’ was not an action aimed at Albanians.19 But in the September elections, Albanian 
voters shifted away from the DPS-SDP coalition and Dinosha’s Democratic Union of 
Albanians (Demokratska unija Albanaca – DUA) in favour the Albanian Alternative 
(Albanska alternativa – AA) and the Democratic Alliance (Demokratski savez – DS).
But, of course, one must be careful not to interpret these realignments through an ethnic 
lens. The post-referendum euphoria also quickly dissipated, even for some of those who 
had been an integral part of the pro-independence bloc. For them, it wasn’t about 
ethnic or national distinctions. A rather heterogeneous group had forged a coalition 
based on the premise that they had the same objective – independence. The DPS, other 
pro-independence parties, nationalist (and non-nationalist) intellectuals, civil society 
activists and journalists and editorial staff from print media such as Vijesti and Monitor 
all rallied behind independence. While many may have been uncomfortable with such 
an arrangement, they supported Djukanović as the figurehead of the pro-independence 
bloc, and they accepted the principle of ‘statehood first; democracy second’, expecting 
that a recalibration the Montenegrin political landscape would ensue in the post-
referendum period. This, it was assumed, would lead to greater democratisation which 
would, by extension, lead to the end of the dominance of the DPS and the advent of a 
democratic system with a greater equilibrium among political parties. Moreover, and 
perhaps naively, they expected these transformations to be driven, or at least aided, by 
the presence of diplomatic representatives, a small army of which arrived throughout 
2006 and 2007. They were, however, to be disappointed. Of the many countries that 
established embassies or representatives in Podgorica following the declaration of 
independence, few sought to force the issue of democratic reform.
The editorial policy of Monitor and Vijesti changed dramatically within a year 
of independence. In their view, Djukanović, while being a legitimate vehicle for 
attaining independence, was the main obstacle to further reform. Articles vehemently 
criticising him became more frequent and bitter exchanges between editorial staff 
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and government officials became increasingly commonplace. This reached a zenith 
in September 2007 when Željko Ivanović, the editor of Vijesti was assaulted by three 
masked men in Podgorica. Almost immediately, he publicly accused Djukanović of 
arranging the attack upon him, stating that the assault had been a revenge for his 
newspaper’s publication of articles criticising Djukanović (in particular with regard to 
the controversial award of an ‘International League of Humanists’ peace prize given to 
Djukanović in 2007).20
The tensions between Vijesti and the government remained high, but the former’s 
position was weakened by the fact that many of their natural supporters had embarked 
on a different path. Many of those who had opposed Djukanović in the past had now 
become ‘establishment’ figures with newly-acquired wealth or fame; rewarded for their 
role during the referendum process. The role of the intellectuals and journalists was, after 
all, to provide justifications for independence, to provide theoretical underpinnings for 
the government’s actions; a small, but important, factor in convincing the population 
of the merits and benefits of independence. By so doing, many profited, in one form or 
another. Careers were built upon support for the government, and the anti-war moral 
capital accumulated by many during the early 1990s traded instead for secure positions 
within the state system – some in business (e.g. as directors of state companies), some 
in government ministries, some within the university sector, others rewarded with 
greater exposure in the media. 
But some who had played important roles in 2006 fell from grace soon after. Jevrem 
Brković, the founder of the Dukljan Academy of Arts and Sciences (DANU), was 
a case in point. Forced into exile in 1991 for his opposition to the Montenegrin 
involvement in the shelling of Dubrovnik, Brković returned following the DPS split 
in 1997.21 He remained a relatively marginal figure outside his cabal of supporters in 
Cetinje until the early 2000s, whereupon he placed himself firmly in the service of the 
government. Publicly rehabilitated, even by media such as Pobjeda who had once cast 
him as an enemy of the state, he began to regularly appear (with increasing frequency 
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in the run up to the referendum) on Montenegrin TV, radio, and within the pages of 
the print media. Brković found himself at the forefront of the independence campaign. 
But after that objective of independence had been achieved, his brand of Montenegrin 
nationalism (the Dukljan variant) was considered a hazard, rather than a benefit. 
In November 2006, Brković was assaulted, and his bodyguard killed, in Podgorica, 
following the release of his book Ljubavnik Duklje (The Lover of Duklja), which (albeit 
through the use of pseudonyms) alluded to the involvement of several high-ranking 
officials in Montenegro’s criminal underworld. Yet despite Brković’s claims, there have 
been no charges raised against his attackers, and he faded into relative obscurity
Tensions between Vijesti and the government continued to increase. The major 
bone of contention was the granting of a public broadcast frequency to Vijesti TV 
(formed in 2008) that would allow the station to be accessible to viewers in Podgorica. 
Slavoljub Sčekić, the director of Vijesti TV argued that their inability to gain access 
to the public frequency network represented a case of ‘harassment’ and ‘institutional 
violence’ against the opposition press.22 Moreover, the owners of Vijesti argued that the 
government were attempting to force them out of existence by starving the station of 
vital advertising revenue (that would be generated by wider access to the public) and 
the pursuit of excessive lawsuits against them.
Matters worsened following an incident involving Miodrag Mugoša (the mayor of 
Podgorica and high-ranking DPS official) and two Vijesti journalists (Mihailo Jovović 
and Boris Pejović). In August 2009, the two journalists photographed Mr Mugoša’s 
official car illegally parked in front of an establishment known to be frequented by the 
mayor. Upon seeing this, Mr Mugoša and two of his associates arrived on the scene 
and a fracas ensued. According to the two journalists, the troika assaulted them. Of 
course, another version of events was offered by Mugoša, who claimed that his party 
were attacked by the two journalists. Eventually, the prosecutor’s office in Podgorica 
raised indictments against Jovović and Mugoša’s son, Miljan (who was subsequently 
dismissed from his post in the Montenegrin diplomatic service). Editorial staff at 
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Vijesti continued to claim that these indictments were raised to divert attention away 
from Mugoša’s role in the incident, and that he himself should be subject to criminal 
proceedings. It demonstrated, they argued, that certain people in the DPS were ‘above 
the law.’ In April 2010, Mugoša was fined €400 for the confrontation.
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From the 2007 
constitution to the 
recognition of Kosovo
Formally ratified and adopted on 22 October 2007, the constitution was fiercely debated. 
After protracted and heated discussions lasting six months, it was eventually supported 
by two-thirds of the parliament, negating the need for a referendum. The passing of the 
constitution fulfilled one of the criteria required for eventual EU membership, and came 
just one week after the signing of the SAA. Positive, yes, but debates over the constitution 
laid bare the continuing tensions between Serb parties and the government – the key 
battlegrounds being the issues of language and citizenship.23 The new constitution 
recognised Montenegrin as the official language of the country, but recognised Serbian, 
Bosnian and Croatian as ‘in official use.’24 Cyrillic and Latin script were recognised as 
equal. However, the recognition of Montenegrin as the country’s official language caused 
consternation among Serb parties; a language they claimed was a political construct. 
The issue of dual citizenship was also highly contentious, given different approaches 
that Serbia and Montenegro had adopted. Serbia allows dual citizenship, and offers 
citizenship to Serbs wherever they live, including Montenegro. By contrast, Montenegro 
has feared that this might undermine its statehood, particularly if a high proportion of 
people in the country took dual Serbian-Montenegrin citizenship. The constitution that 
was adopted was something of a compromise, but it proved inflexible enough to alienate 
both Serb and Albanian parties. The former on the basis that Serbian was no longer the 
official language and that they no longer enjoyed the right of dual citizenship; the latter 
largely because their demand that Tuzi (part of the Podgorica municipality) was not 
granted the status of a separate municipality. Amidst calls from Serb parties to protest 
against the adoption of the ‘discriminatory’ constitution, Milo Djukanović, ostensibly 
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in retirement, hailed the passing of the constitution as the completion of the restoration 
of Montenegrin statehood. The OSCE Mission in Montenegro also welcomed the 
adoption of the new constitution, noting that the constitution was generally in line with 
recommendations from the Council of Europe and OSCE institutions.25
Soon after the adoption of the constitution, a familiar figure returned to the political fold. 
Milo Djukanović, who had retired from the post of prime minister in 2006, returned to 
replace Željko Šturanović, who had stepped-down owing to ill-health. Critics pointed 
to a conflict of interests. Djukanović had, after all, spent over a year consolidating his 
business interests, and he owned shares in the First Bank of Montenegro (Prva banka 
Crne Gore).26 They also suggested that he had returned to politics to invoke immunity 
from potential charges (for alleged involvement in cigarette smuggling) emanating 
from the prosecutor’s office in Bari in Italy. Nevertheless, a new government was 
formed on 29 February. The issue of Kosovo, despite the 2008 unilateral declaration of 
independence, was not a major factor in the subsequent April 2008 Presidential election 
campaign. Only when the Montenegrin government subsequently recognised Kosovo’s 
independence, in October 2008, was any sense of political crisis apparent. Prior to that, 
a lively presidential campaign pitted the incumbent, Filip Vujanović (DPS) against the 
three strongest opposition leaders – Andrija Mandić (SL), Nebojša Medojević (PzP) 
and Srdjan Milić (SNP). Called by the Speaker of the Parliament (and President of 
the SDP), Ranko Krivokapić, on the 17 January. The presidential election was the first 
presidential vote to be held since the independence referendum and under the October 
2007 constitution.
Generally, the pre-election campaign was conducted bereft of the ethnic and national 
issues that dominated the constitutional debates, with all candidates focusing primarily 
on economic issues, European integration, development and social welfare issues.27 
Kosovo, while a significant regional issues, was rather conspicuous by its absence on 
the respective candidates’ agendas (although both Mandić and Milić visited Kosovo 
during the campaign). However, it was Vujanović’s well-organised and well-funded 
15
campaign that drew, ultimately, the most votes. Campaigning under the slogan of Bez 
dilema (Without Dilemma), Vujanović’s ‘door-to-door’ campaign was more visible and 
effective than that of his opponents. The catchy slogan did indeed suggest that there 
was no dilemma among voters, 52% of which voted for the DPS’s candidate. Andrija 
Mandić finished runner-up with just short of 20%, while Medojević and Milić won 17 
% and 12% respectively.28
Throughout the campaign, Kosovo had been largely relegated. However, when the 
Montenegrin government eventually recognised Kosovo and signalled their intention 
to establish full diplomatic relations with Prishtina, it generated significant controversy. 
That Kosovo had been a factor in Montenegrin politics was nothing novel; it had been 
an ever-present in Montenegrin politics (in 1989 and 1999) and was a particularly 
emotive issue for Montenegro’s Serbs.29 In the wake of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration 
of independence in February 2008, the Montenegrin government adopted a neutral 
position, with an emphasis being placed on the need for further dialogue – but 
appeared to shift toward the Serbian line following the visit by the Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergey Lavrov, in April 2007.30 But this perceived shift threatened to 
undermine relations between the government and the Albanian minority (5.03% of 
the population). It would be impossible to find a satisfactory ‘middle way’ that would 
placate both Montenegro’s Albanian minority and the, significantly larger (31.99%), 
Serb minority.
The Serb minority opposed recognition, and the parties representing them warned that 
recognition could lead to ‘internal instability’.31 In the wake of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence, demonstrations organised by Serb parties took place in Podgorica, 
with Andrija Mandić subsequently travelling to northern Mitrovica to show solidarity 
with the Kosovo Serbs. He implored the Montenegrin government not to recognise an 
independent Kosovo, adding that such recognition would represent a ‘historic error.’32 
It was a clear signal Montenegro’s Serbs were united over the issue, and would not be 
inactive in the event of recognition.
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Conversely, however, procrastination over recognition generated resentment among 
Montenegro’s Albanians, who interpreted what they perceived to be an unnecessary 
delay in the recognition of Kosovo as ‘anti-Albanian’. Relations between the 
government and the Albanians were, on the whole, good, and Albanians were well 
integrated into Montenegrin state structures. Some Albanian parties, however, had 
sought greater levels of autonomy in certain spheres. In terms of education, linguistic 
parity at all levels of education was a key issue, largely due to the fact that, in 
Montenegro, university education is offered only in Serbian (or Montenegrin). The 
second bone of contention was the status of the predominantly Albanian area of Tuzi. 
The third issue was the use of national symbols. Albanian leaders consistently argued 
that Albanian symbols should be used more liberally and expressed dismay that their 
flag could not be raised on the Tuzi council building. But these issues were more 
matters of practicality than of emotion; the issue of Kosovo was different. Nevertheless, 
no Montenegrin Albanian leader, despite their support for an independent Kosovo, 
publicly called for separation or incited separatism among Montenegro’s Albanians.33 
Nevertheless, Albanian politicians urged the Montenegrin government not to delay 
recognition, stating that they would continue to lobby for the recognition of Kosovo.
Regional and international factors were also crucial, particularly given Montenegro’s 
progress towards EU candidacy. Close to home, the Montenegrin government were 
eager to avoid antagonising (again) their traditional ally, Serbia, with whom they 
enjoyed only lukewarm relations since the referendum in May 2006. But they were 
equally eager to preserve good relations with those countries (particularly the US and 
UK) that had already recognised Kosovo, and were ‘encouraging’ others to do likewise. 
Serbia’s President, Boris Tadić, and Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, appealed to the 
Montenegrins to support Serbia’s appeal to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to raise 
their case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), warning that recognition would 
be seen in Serbia as a ‘stab in the back.’34 A parliamentary resolution tabled in the days 
prior to the UNGA meeting, however, stated that Montenegro would pursue a policy 
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in keeping with their ‘Euro-Atlantic orientation’, was a relatively unambiguous signal 
that they may be preparing to just that. The Montenegrin leadership delayed until the 
UNGA had voted on the matter, but on 9 October, having voted in favour of Serbia’s 
request to refer the case to the ICJ, they announced (in concert with FYR Macedonia) 
that they would formally recognise Kosovo as an independent state. Anticipating the 
controversy that would inevitably follow, Djukanović sought to justify the action 
his government had taken.35 Presenting Kosovo’s independence as a fait accompli, he 
argued that Montenegro could no longer deny the ‘political reality’ of an independent 
Kosovo, simultaneously appealing to citizens to recognise that it was logical to play 
the long game. It was implied, moreover, that recognition would bring ‘benefits’ (an 
allusion, no doubt, to an acceleration of Montenegro’s EU and NATO membership). 
However succinct, it was not an argument accepted by Serbia, which immediately 
declared the Montenegrin ambassador in Belgrade, Anka Vojvodić, persona non grata. 
Nor were such ‘pragmatic’ arguments accepted within the, albeit divided, Serb bloc.
Seeking to capitalise on the anger that was generated by recognition (and the lack of 
public consultation in advance of the decision), the opposition called on those who 
did not advocate recognition to demonstrate against what they deemed an illegal 
and undemocratic act. During the demonstrations, the largest of which was held in 
Podgorica on the evening of 13 October, they set out their three key demands: that the 
government reverse their decision; that a referendum on recognition be held; and that 
early parliamentary elections be scheduled before the end of 2008. A series of speakers 
made their case in front of a responsive crowd. The atmosphere was tense but peaceful, 
but as the evening wore on, the atmosphere darkened. In scenes reminiscent of the 
attempted storming of the government building by pro-Milošević groups in January 
1998 following Djukanović’s victory over Momir Bulatović in the 1997 Presidential 
elections, protestors attempted to storm Montenegro’s parliament building. The police 
reacted, using tear gas and baton charges to disperse the crowds.36 In the aftermath, 
each side sought to pin responsibility on the other, with government officials claiming 
that ‘agitators’ from Belgrade had been instrumental in orchestrating the violence. 
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Opposition leaders argued that the violence had been orchestrated by Montenegrin 
state security in an attempt to discredit the demonstrators.37
The exchanges between the government and the opposition became increasingly 
adversarial and antagonistic. Acting, it was claimed, in the interests of Montenegro’s 
citizens, the government banned further demonstrations. This was not an 
undemocratic act, they argued, but one which was required to avoid further violence 
and ensure citizens’ security. In response, opposition deputies boycotted parliament 
and Andrija Mandić embarked upon a well-publicised hunger-strike which lasted 
almost two weeks.38 Both his hunger strike and his supporters’ subsequent ‘long 
march’ from Berane to Podgorica received significant media coverage.39 The Serbian 
Orthodox Church (SPC), too, entered the debate. The Metropolitan of the SPC in 
Montenegro, Amfilohije Radović, declared that he ‘respected Andrija’s sacrifice’, while 
simultaneously warning that the actions of the Montenegrin government were helping 
to create the conditions for further conflict in Kosovo.40 Yet despite the fiery rhetoric, 
and the best efforts of the opposition to maintain momentum, the intensity waned 
soon after Mandić ended his hunger strike. 
What this course of events revealed, if nothing else, was that the opposition remained 
beset by deep differences (not least on the issue of Kosovo). If anything, Kosovo, a 
highly emotive issue for some, but less for others, served to divide rather than unite 
them. Conversely, recognition of Kosovo proved beneficial for the government on 
not one but two fronts. Domestically, they could argue that the demonstrations were 
evidence that the state was under threat from extremists and measures (that would 
increase the government’s control) could justifiably be implemented to protect citizens. 
They appeared resolute while the opposition, having proved incapable of articulating 
a unified message, appeared weakened.41 Local elections, held in Kotor, following 
recognition signalled that the DPS had indeed escaped the controversy relatively 
unscathed, winning twice as many votes as the runners-up (SNP).42
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The decision to recognise Kosovo may have ingratiated the Montenegrin government 
to London and Washington, but did little to stem pressure emanating from Brussels 
(the latter having no formal position on the issue). Despite making progress in the EU 
accession process, criticism over the government’s lack of will in tackling the problems 
of corruption and organised crime, the questionable independence of the judiciary, had 
increased in intensity throughout 2008 and were emphasised in the 2008 EC progress 
report. If the Montenegrin government had assumed that the decision to recognise 
Kosovo would give them breathing space vis-à-vis issues of EU conditionality, they 
had miscalculated. Nevertheless, there was an overarching acknowledgement that the 
issue of Kosovo was a thorny one for the Montenegrin government, and they had 
demonstrated courage in taking the decision.43 There may have been no tangible 
benefit from recognition, but it earned Montenegro credit among key states (the US, 
UK and Germany) that would now consolidate their support for Montenegro’s EU 
accession. The Montenegrin government had, perhaps rather by luck than judgement, 
conspired to use Kosovo to their advantage. 
Assessing Five Years of Montenegro’s Independence
Forging effective opposition 
The only opposition leader to capitalise from the Kosovo recognition crisis was 
Srdjan Milić, the President of the SNP. The party, and its leader Predrag Bultović, 
were demoralised and defeated after the referendum, and it was unclear whether 
the SNP, seemingly a spent force, could recover. The 2006 parliamentary elections 
appeared to confirm that the party was indeed in terminal decline; the SNP-NS-DSS 
coalition gathering only 14% of the vote. But recover they did, under Milić’s capable 
stewardship. The SNP, erstwhile associates of Slobodan Milošević and foremost 
articulator of the pro-union argument, would, in Milić’s view, have to adapt to survive. 
Thus he distanced the party from NS and DSS (its traditional ideological bedfellows) 
and shifted toward a social democratic position, which embraced both EU accession 
and NATO membership. This strategy appeared to generate little tangible success 
during the presidential elections, but Milić’s measured comments during the Kosovo 
controversy indicated that the SNP had passed through a definitive transformation.
Others were also re-positioning their parties within the domestic political framework. 
Andrija Mandić, perhaps understanding that the SNS’s current stance negated it 
becoming a mainstream party, signalled his intention to form a new political party, 
one that would draw together moderate strains within the SL. Mandić sought to forge 
a pro-European profile, hoping that by doing so he could broaden his party’s (and his) 
appeal. But this, of course, meant that he had to marginalise those elements within 
the SL which might inhibit such a significant ideological shift. Those marginalised 
reacted badly to Mandić’s new initiative, claiming that he had ‘sold out’ Serbs, accepted 
Montenegrin independence, and blatantly contradicted his post-referendum rhetoric. 
But while Mandić could survive attacks coming from the right of the SL, he needed 
the support of his own party (SNS). This, however, was not entirely forthcoming, and 
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a number of prominent party members, including Novak Radulović, left the SNS, 
claiming that Mandić had destroyed the true spirit of the party.
Mandić’s potential coalition partners, PzP, were also in some difficulty. Their own 
intra-party crisis reached its zenith when a number among their ranks, including the 
former deputy chairman, Goran Batrićević, left the party to form the Democratic 
Centre (Demokratski centar – DC). The breakaway had its roots in disagreements 
about both the party’s orientation and Medojević’s role within it. Batričević argued 
that Medojević had drawn too close to the SNP and SNS, had been compromised 
during the Kosovo demonstrations. Moreover, it was alleged, Medojević’s ‘autocratic 
style’ had alienated many within the party.44 Batrićević’s DC subsequently entered a 
coalition with the Liberal Party (Liberalna stranka – LS), both parties stressing that 
neither would enter any kind of pact with the DPS in the event of early elections.
In January 2009, with the opposition in disarray, the government called early elections, 
despite the fact that they were not due for 18 months. Having just submitted their 
application for EU membership, the government stated that they were going to the 
polls early in order to attain a further four-year mandate, time enough to complete the 
next stage of the EU accession process. Cynics were quick to argue that the elections 
were called early, not for the aforementioned reasons, but because by so doing the 
government could secure a new mandate before the effects of the global economic 
downturn became apparent. Even if such accusations were unfounded, the economy 
was a key, and potentially problematic, issue for the government. Having grown steadily 
since 2000 (when Montenegro forged an economic policy quite different from its then 
federal partner Serbia), the economy grew rapidly after independence. Montenegro 
became a member of both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank in January 2007, and thus had access to finance from either organisation. Yet, 
there was little need. Between 2002 and 2008 Montenegro enjoyed the fastest Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the region. Unemployment levels dropped 
significantly (from 33% in 2002 to 10.8% in 2008), the country had a budget surplus 
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and foreign debt was reduced from 42.6% of GDP in 2005 to just 27% in 2008.45 FDI 
levels had also increased significantly, and by the time (in July 2007) The Observer had 
trumpeted Montenegro as ‘Europe’s New Golden Coast’, investors from Ireland, the 
UK, and (primarily) Russia flocked to the country.46 As consequence, Montenegro’s 
development further fed the economy, the country’s export market grew and further 
economic growth was supported by significant expansions in construction, tourism 
and the services sector.
The flow of money into Montenegro was lightning fast. This, coupled with an 
aggressive and rapid privatisation process, created a new, and often brash, nouveau 
riche at the expense of many ordinary citizens. The coastal town of Budva, awash with 
Russian money, and a number of elaborate – and at times bizarre – constructions 
(such as the so-called ‘Russian Village’ above Sveti Stefan) were erected (some of 
which had no planning permission in place before construction began). But this, often 
tasteless, ostentation and the sudden appearance of shiny new glass and steel buildings 
(particularly in Podgorica and on the coast around Budva) masked underlying 
problems. The current account deficit expanded sharply during 2006, to more than 
30% of GDP and consumer debt increased significantly.47 The economic boom and 
the growing consumer and commercial confidence which existed in 2006-2997 began 
to evaporate by 2008, as the economy began to feel the impact of the global economic 
downturn.48 The property market slumped and businesses struggled to stay afloat as 
banks ceased lending.
The most potent manifestation of the seriousness of the crisis, however, came in 
the form of the gloom that enveloped the Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP) 
plant. In December 2005, KAP was privatised, with 65% of its shares being bought 
by Salomon Enterprises Limited (later re-named the Central European Aluminum 
Company – CEAC), owned by the Russian billionaire, Oleg Deripaska. The sale of 
the shares generated controversy; the final deal allegedly struck in a private meeting 
between Deripaska and Djukanović.
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Initially, all was well – independence coincided with high aluminum prices, but the 
decreasing market value of aluminium and the expense of running the plant determined 
that KAP was losing an estimated €200,000 daily. The Montenegrin national 
electricity supplier (Elektroprivreda Crne Gore – EPCG) at one stage threatened to 
cease supplying electricity to the plant over unpaid bills, although it did not act upon it. 
The government were under pressure to act. Given that the KAP plant was one of the 
largest employers in Montenegro and accounted for a 15% of the country’s total GDP, 
a closure of the plant could generate significant discontent (it is estimated that 10,000 
people directly or indirectly relied on KAP for their incomes). In June 2009, having 
had an offer of financial aid to CEAC declined, the government opted to partially 
renationalise, by buying back a substantial stake in the plant.49
The March 2009 election campaign took place, therefore, in a context of growing 
concern about the gathering economic storm and the potential implications for the 
Montenegrin economy.50 At a time when the government were more sensitive than 
normal to social issues, the spectre of economic crisis was still sufficiently abstract to 
make a tangible impact on the political scene. The DPS-led ‘European Montenegro’ 
(Evropska Crna Gora) coalition was returned to power in the parliamentary election, 
the coalition comprising of the DPS, its long-standing junior partner, the SDP and a 
number of minority parties, garnered more than 50% of the vote, with the coalition 
winning 48 seats (in the 81-seat) parliament, an increase compared with the 41 that 
it won in the previous parliamentary election in 2006. The opposition, seeking to 
capitalise on the resentment generated by the Kosovo recognition, failed to make 
headway. They proved incapable of forging a coalition, largely due to individual parties 
giving primacy to their own, rather than the collective, interest. The SNP, who were 
the subject of speculation that they may be willing to enter a future coalition with the 
DPS, were particularly rigid in this regard. Having assessed that the divisions within 
NOVA and PzP rendered them unreliable coalition partners, they opted to run alone, 
with the objective of reclaiming the position it once held for a decade as Montenegro’s 
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leading opposition party. They calculated correctly, winning 16 seats in the parliament, 
an increase of 5 since the 2006 election.
By contrast, PzP won only five seats, less than half of those won in 2006. Early 
optimism that they might become a force capable of challenging the DPS’s dominance 
remained unfulfilled. Seeking to undermine the DPS by focusing on alleged corruption 
and links to organised crime proved an ineffective strategy, and regardless of the 
increasingly difficult economic climate they could not convince voters to back them. 
NOVA, meanwhile, could only garner 9% of the vote, giving them 8 seats in parliament. 
Nevertheless, endeavours to forge a working opposition coalition continued unabated. 
Particularly active was Nebojša Medojević, who sought to bring together opposition 
political parties, NGOs and other non-parliamentary structures into a broad coalition 
front that would challenge the ruling coalition, a strategy that would, albeit slowly, 
bearing fruit. The coalition was formed (comprising NOVA, SNP, PzP, DSS & NS) in 
time to contest the approaching local elections in May 2010. 
The results of Montenegro’s municipal elections, held on 23 May 2010, appeared to 
demonstrate that the country’s politics continues to follow a familiar script. But while 
the seemingly resounding election victory of the ‘Coalition for a European Montenegro’ 
(Koalicija za Evropsku Crnu Goru), led by the DPS, may have, on a superficial level, 
seemed convincing, the result obscured the bigger picture. Increasingly nervous about 
the momentum of the opposition, the government called the municipal elections 
for 23 May against the wishes of the opposition who wanted the elections held on 6 
June. The latter’s objection was that the government would use the coincidence of the 
election campaign with the fourth anniversary of Montenegrin independence to subtly 
remind the electorate of the DPS’s key role in delivering independence. And indeed, 
the leadership of the DPS-led coalition did just that; their rhetorical cornerstone being 
‘safety in continuity’. The inexperienced, and ‘anti-Montenegrin’ opposition, they argued, 
could not be trusted to govern at any level in these tough economic times. Nebojša 
Medojević, cast as an ambitious charlatan motivated by his own desire for power, was 
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singled out as a case in point.51 And such attacks were not merely limited to opposition 
politicians. On the eve of the elections, Milo Djukanović alleged that one of the Serbian 
President Boris Tadić’s closest advisors had been tasked with providing financial and 
logistical assistance to the opposition, with a view, in Djukanović’s words, to ‘reversing 
Montenegro’s independence’.52
The ‘Better Montenegro’ (Bolja Crna Gora) coalition, consisting of 12 parties, but led by 
the PzP, NOVA and the SNP, contested the elections following months of negotiations. 
The coalition, also supported by NGOs and other non-governmental structures, 
appeared to have little to unite them but their almost pathological hatred of the ruling 
elite. Nevertheless, they went to great lengths to emphasise their commonalities, whilst 
playing down clear differences. They attacked the government’s record of managing 
the country’s economic affairs, their alleged lack of strategy for mitigating the effects of 
the economic crisis and inefficiency of state institutions in the fight against organised 
crime. While the term ‘change’ was omnipresent, Medojević, adorned in his now-
characteristic white shirt with rolled-up sleeves a-la-Obama, stuck to traditional 
rhetoric, speaking at length about the alleged links between Djukanović and organised 
crime. These public pronouncements represented a risky gambit for Medojević, and it 
remains unclear whether his actions attracted or repelled voters.
Yet, despite the efforts of the opposition, the DPS weathered the storm. The party 
claimed victory in seven of the 14 contested municipalities, including the traditional 
opposition strongholds of Andrijevica, Kolašin and Žabljak, increasing their overall 
share of the vote. The opposition, who on the eve of the election had predicted 
a ‘landslide’ in their favour, claimed victory in Pljevlja and the SNP, who ran 
independently in some municipalities, did so in Plužine. The opposition drew further 
encouragement from the fact that the presence of a strong opposition coalition stopped 
the DPS from acquiring an absolute majority in the capital, Podgorica. In the light of 
these results, however, it remained unclear who will become the symbolic leader of the 
opposition. Increasingly, the SNP President, Srdjan Milić, has emerged as the most 
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likely. In December 2010, the three main opposition leaders embarked upon a tour of 
European capitals (Brussels, Berlin and London) to make their case. Whether they can 
unite as a serious challenger to the DPS remains, however, unclear.
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The rise and fall 
of Milo Djukanović
Milo Djukanović is the most charismatic, pragmatic, single-minded, (politically) 
intelligent and ruthless politician to emerge in Montenegro, certainly in the past 
few decades. His ability to adapt quickly and decisively in fluid political situations, 
his instinct for political survival, and his ability to outwit his political opponents is 
impressive. These qualities have determined his longevity as the dominant political 
figure in Montenegro. The phenomenon of Djukanović can – to some extent – be 
understood by how he is perceived among his countrymen. Even his most vehement 
critics acknowledge that he possesses qualities (bravery, strength, ruthlessness, charm, 
physical presence) that are highly regarded in Montenegrin society. He has become, 
according to the Bosnian weekly Slobodna Bosna ‘The New Montenegrin Vladika.’53 
And there has, since 1997 at least, little in the way of a challenge to this dominance. As 
the symbolic leader of the independence bloc, he both generated (and had bestowed upon 
him) the image of ‘the father of the nation’, personifying the quest for independence. 
Retiring from politics for a short time in 2006 (to concentrate on his business interests), 
he returned to take the role of Prime Minster in 2008, he nevertheless remained a 
powerful figure operating from behind the scenes.54 Indeed, during his brief sabbatical 
he retained the chairmanship of the DPS and was generally assumed to be pulling the 
strings from behind the scenes.55 And, of course, although he has recently stepped-
down as Prime Minister, he has, again, remained the chairman of the DPS.
Djukanović is a divisive figure, worshiped by his admirers and despised (almost 
pathologically) by his detractors. But whether belonging to the former, latter or (more 
rarely) neutral camp, there exists a grudging respect for his achievements. In short, it 
is hard to make the case that he has been anything but a factor for stability in times of 
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great flux, and when the country needed strong leadership. He has forged a semblance 
of political stability and brought Montenegro to the cusp of the government’s 
core objective of Euro-Atlantic integration.56 Yet, however much one may admire 
Djukanović’s undoubted qualities, it is inherently unhealthy for one individual to 
wield so much unchallenged power and influence.
However impressive his political pedigree, it hasn’t been all plain sailing. Djukanović 
has been dogged by persistent allegations of links to the Italian mafia, the Balkan 
underworld and alleged criminals such as Andrija Drašković and the Swiss-based 
Serbian businessman, Stanko ‘Cane’ Subotić. This has fuelled the perception among 
EU officials that he may not have the will to push the reforms required to meet the 
EU’s strict criteria.57 Thus, Washington and Brussels had a paradoxical relationship 
with Djukanović: He was a man they could communicate effectively with, a man they 
trusted, a man who they knew possessed the clout to make things happen. Yet, his 
reputation was tarnished by all of the aforementioned associations.
Accusations that Djukanović had been involved in the illicit cigarette smuggling 
business date back to 2001, when articles appeared in the Croatian weekly Nacional 
implicating him. Almost simultaneously, the former Italian finance minister, Ottavio 
del Turco, publicly accused Djukanović of being closely linked to organised crime, 
being the lynchpin in the illegal mechanisms that controlled the smuggling of 
cigarettes in the Balkans, and having provided safe haven for Italian criminals in the 
Montenegrin town of Bar. By July 2002, the public prosecutor in the Italian port city 
of Bari, Guisseppe Scelsi, initiated investigative proceedings against the Montenegrin 
president. The accusation was that Djukanović (in concert with the Italian mafia and 
the cigarette manufacturers R. J. Reynolds and Philip Morris) smuggled large amounts 
of untaxed cigarettes into the EU from the port of Bar in Montenegro – generating 
significant profits for all the participants.58 These profits, claimed Djukanović, were 
not channelled into private hands, but used to pay for the state’s running costs during 
the period of UN-imposed sanctions – a matter, not of profit, but of patriotic duty. 
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Djukanović surprised even his critics when he travelled to Bari in March 2008, where 
he was questioned by Italian prosecutors.59 The matter appeared to be at an end.
But in October 2009, Ratko Knežević, a London-based Montenegrin businessman, 
one-time head of the Montenegrin trade mission in the United States, and a former 
associate of Djukanović gave a series of interviews to Vijesti and the Belgrade daily 
Blic in which he reiterated claims that the Djukanović had been a pivotal figure in a 
criminal organisation which included the former head of the Serbian secret service, 
Jovica Stanišić (on trial in The Hague on war crimes charges), and Stanko ‘Cane’ 
Subotić (who was indicted for tobacco smuggling in Serbia). Knežević claimed the 
group controlled the cigarette smuggling racket throughout Southeast Europe. More 
controversially, however, Knežević implied that the ‘cartel’ was responsible for ordering 
murders, including those of Ivo Pukanić, the owner of the Croatian weekly Nacional, 
his colleague Niko Franjić, who were killed in a car bomb in Zagreb in October 2008, 
and Duško Jovanović, the editor of the Montenegrin daily Dan, who was shot dead 
outside his office in Podgorica in 2004. Both Pukanić and Jovanović had investigated 
and written extensively about the alleged criminal activities of several high-profile 
Montenegrins, Djukanovic being foremost among them.60 Eventually, the Serbian 
Special Prosecution indicted Sreten Jočić (aka ‘Joca’ Amsterdam), along with two of 
his accomplices in October 2009 on charges of organising Pukanić’s murder. No link 
with Djukanović has ever been established.
Nebojša Medojević (PzP) also spoke publicly, and at some length, about Djukanović’s 
alleged links with organised crime. In addition to his regular accusations that Milo 
Djukanović was an instrumental player in the cigarette smuggling trade in the 1990s, 
he also alleged that the Šarić brothers (one of whom, Darko, was wanted by Interpol 
and the Serbian government on drug trafficking charges) had funded the DPS’s election 
campaign in Žabljak in August 2009.61 Medojević also claimed that the Montenegrin 
businessman, Branislav Mićunović, had forged close links with Darko Šarić and 
had used his links with Montenegro’s political elite to ensure that the latter evaded 
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arrest in Montenegro. Highlighting organised crime and corruption cases was not 
without consequences; in February 2010, Medojević was attacked outside his home in 
Podgorica. He claimed that the assault represented a clear warning from the mafia to 
cease his crusade against organised crime structures in Montenegro.
But what effect did these rumours have on Djukanović? These accusations had, after 
all, been circulating for years. But Knežević’s intervention brought the uncomfortable 
subject to prominence once again, and in a meeting between Mr Djukanović and US 
Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg in New York, the latter raised concerns 
that that such rumours were damaging for the Montenegrin government. Whether the 
continued controversy over these matters was a causal factor, on 21 December 2010, 
Milo Djukanović announced that he would be stepping down as prime minister, with 
the mandate passing to the Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Lukšić. 
Tired of politics, Djukanović claimed he was doing so to concentrate on his business 
interests.62 Once again, as in 1989 and 1997 (two moments of cathartic political change; 
namely, the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ and the DPS split), change was facilitated, not 
through the mechanism of democratic elections, but from within the existing structure 
of power.63 As Cohen points out, “democracy in Montenegro must still be tested by the 
fundamental experience in succession of leadership and political parties – and not just 
a temporary sabbatical from political power on Djukanović’s part.”64
The fact remains that Montenegro holds the unenviable record of being the only state 
in Southeast Europe that has been governed, uninterrupted, by the same political party 
(albeit with internal purges) since the first democratic elections in 1990. To some extent, 
the party is the state, and the DPS’s well-established control over the instruments of 
it awards them a significant advantage over the opposition. Their budget for election 
campaigns alone significantly outstrips their closest competitors, and in elections 
voters continue to support the DPS because they are the likely victors. After all, the 
patronage of those in power is crucial to employment (particularly those who work in 
the public sector) and social advancement. Moreover, no opposition politician has yet 
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emerged that has been charismatic enough to challenge Milo Djukanović. Given this, 
political change in Montenegro may have its limitations, and may only be possible if 
there is a split within, or significant defection from, the DPS. 
Rumours of a possible split within the party were the subject of intense speculation 
throughout 2010. In the knowledge that Djukanović would step-down, two factions 
emerged within the party, both of which had their eyes on the succession process. 
Djukanović endeavoured to consolidate the position of loyalists within the DPS; 
investing significant energy into ensuring that primacy would be achieved by his 
chosen successor(s). Two became ascendant; namely Igor Lukšić and Duško Marković 
(the former head of Montenegro’s state security). The former was more ‘marketable’ 
and thus the more likely heir apparent, with the latter designated the role of internal 
party whip. Indeed, Djukanović’s decision to designate Marković the post of ‘minister 
without portfolio’ was almost certainly an attempt to discipline party deputies who 
may be inclined to seek to acquire power. In short, his strategy was thus: empower 
close allies and marginalise potential opponents, and by doing so shape the internal 
composition of the upper echelons of the DPS, one that would remain under his 
influence even in the event of his formal departure.
But not all within the DPS leadership advocated Lukšić’s appointment, or the way in 
which the succession process was handled. Montenegro’s President, Filip Vujanović 
and Deputy Prime Minister, Svetozar Marović both resisted Djukanović’s efforts 
to dictate terms.65 Both endeavoured to improve their position when circumstances 
allowed but were ultimately unsuccessful. Having struggled to convince the key party 
members, they retreated in the face of determined opponents. By the time Djukanović 
formally retired on 21 December, the succession of Lukšić was assured. Svetozar 
Marović stepped down on the same day. Vujanović remained in post, but weakened 
and unlikely to possess enough support within the DPS to mount a challenge in the 
future. Within days the Main Board of the DPS had rubber-stamped Lukšić’s elevation 
to the role of prime minister. The matter of succession had reached its conclusion.
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Igor Lukšić is perceived, at least externally, as a reformer, an individual who belongs 
to a new political generation, untainted by the dark days of the 1990s, and not a one-
time Communist youth apparatchik. Brussels will hope, or rather expect, that he will 
quickly and robustly push through reforms. Successful candidate status, confirmed in 
December 2010, perhaps overshadowed the conclusions of the November EC report 
on Montenegro’s accession progress. While broadly positive, the report highlighted 
seven key priorities, among them reform of the public administration, strengthening 
the rule of law, improving the anti-corruption legal framework and implement the 
government’s anti-corruption plan, strengthening the fight against organised crime, 
enhancing media freedom and implementing anti-discrimination frameworks.66
The criteria are demanding and reaching these ambitious objectives will require strong 
political will and significant flexibility. Nevertheless, the process must begin, and the 
difficult reforms, ones that may have been resisted or impeded thus far, will have to be 
pushed through before Montenegro can become a member-state. There will be tough 
decisions to take, and there will be political casualties. And even if the government 
commit to implementation with brevity, it may take nigh on a decade to meet the 
conditions. In these early days, however, Lukšić has endeavoured to demonstrate his 
commitment to tackling corruption and organised crime, one of the key stipulations 
set out in the November report. In this regard, he took immediate action. He sent 
a very strong signal that he was serious, although these ostensibly anti-corruption 
measures also had a domestic political motivation.
On 24 December, the mayor, Rajko Kuljača, and the deputy mayor of the coastal town of 
Budva were among ten arrested on charges of corruption linked to the so-called ‘Zavala 
case’, an alleged corruption affair which involved politicians, construction companies 
and spatial planners.67 The deputy mayor of Budva was, significantly, Dragan Marović, 
the brother of Svetozar Marović, a potential political challenger within the DPS. 
Following the arrests, the latter said he believed that they were politically motivated, 
and that he urged the authorities to “arrest me, convict me and send me to the darkest 
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prison if that is what is good for Montenegro and in accordance with its laws.”68 Yet 
it appears that this is unlikely to happen; the Montenegrin State Prosecutor’s office 
announced in late December that he will only appear as a witness in the Zavala case.69 
Lukšić, however, stated that the Budva arrests were “not an improvisation”, but part of 
a wider process necessary to meet conditions for EU membership.70
Lukšić has, simultaneously, sought to demonstrate that he is not ‘Milo’s man’ by forging 
his own distinct identity. But it is questionable whether he will pursue, or will be able 
to pursue, a course different from that of his predecessor. This was, after all, a well 
organised succession from within the DPS, not one facilitated through the mechanism 
of democratic elections. And, of course, one should not disregard the clout Djukanović 
will still possess.71 He remains the chairman of the DPS (and will likely continue in 
this role after the upcoming party congress in May 2011) and still enjoys strong support 
among the key figures within it. Djukanović has also ensured that Lukšić is flanked 
by his closest allies. Both Milan Roćen and Duško Marković, staunch Djukanović 
loyalists have been given very senior roles in the government; the former retaining 
his post as foreign minister, the latter has replaced Svetozar Marović as deputy prime 
minister. Moreover, Djukanović has not ruled out a return as a presidential candidate 
in 2013, or at some other stage. In short, he will remain a significant presence, prime 
minister, president or otherwise. This, for better or worse, is what political change 
looks like in Montenegro – at least for the time-being.
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Conclusion: Achievements 
and challenges
To assess Montenegro’s progress as an independent state, one has to first place it in a 
wider historical context. The country has passed through significant traumas in the 
20th century – the First World War, the exile of the Montenegrin royal dynasty, the 
loss of statehood following the Podgorica Assembly in 1918, occupation and bitter 
civil war between 1941 and 1945, bitter recrimination following the 1948 Tito-Stalin 
split (support for the latter was particularly pronounced in Montenegro); all took place 
within four decades but before a period of stability when Montenegro was a republic 
within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslav (SRFY). But by 1991, the country 
had all but collapsed, and in the subsequent chaos, Montenegro became mired in 
the wars that accompanied Yugoslav succession. As a consequence, Montenegro (as 
a republic within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was subject to United Nations 
sanctions and a period of relative international isolation. In 1997, a cathartic split 
within the dominant party (the DPS) led, ultimately, to a subsequent division of the 
body politic into pro-union and pro-independence blocs. One could be excused for 
concluding that independence could not be delivered without conflict. Yet, perhaps 
against the odds, it was. Moreover, almost five years since the May 2006 referendum, 
Montenegro’s subsequent progress has exceeded expectations.
The country is now a formal EU candidate and has made good progress toward NATO 
membership. There is no doubt, therefore, that Euro-Atlantic integration will remain 
the cornerstone of the government’s foreign policy. The former will take prominence 
over the latter, particularly in the light of the award of candidate status; although 
Montenegro will almost certainly join NATO before it does the EU. There is, of course, 
still much work to be done, particularly if Montenegro is to meet the rigid membership 
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conditions set by the EU. Addressing and effectively dealing with the key problems 
outlined by the EC in the November 2010 report will require strong political will and 
even a commitment to face up to some of those powerful individuals whose interests 
would be threatened by genuine reform. This will be neither easy nor possible without 
significant political flux. It may, therefore, be many years before the country can take 
the steps necessary to secure full EU membership. Moreover, it may be determined as 
much by the political landscape within the EU as it will be determined by the speed 
and trajectory of political reform in Montenegro.
Beyond the Euro-Atlantic agenda, economic issues will remain a priority. The post-
referendum boom was essentially reversed by the onset of the global economic 
downturn, and the economy contracted sharply in 2009. This decline led to the 
government engaging in discussions with the IMF, although no loan agreement was 
signed. Since then, the economy has staggered along. A total of 244 companies filed 
for bankruptcy in the first nine months of 2010, almost double the amount that had 
done so in 2009. Under these circumstances, the government have been forced to sell-
off further state resources (such as a controlling share of EPCG to the Italian public 
utility company, A2A) to generate much-needed funds. It has also proved difficult to 
attract FDI, and that which has been generated pales into insignificance compared 
to levels which flooded into the country in 2006-2007. There are some positive signs, 
however. In September 2010, Montenegro raised its first international bond (raising 
€200 million), which economic analysts interpreted as a growing confidence in the 
market of the country’s macroeconomic stability.72 Nevertheless, the budget deficit 
remains relatively large and the broader economic situation remains tenuous. A 
cautious optimism, and with it a modicum of confidence, has returned but there are 
still challenges ahead.
Domestically, the political scene has been marked by change, continuity and relative 
stability. There has been a minor recalibration of the Montenegrin political landscape, 
numerous splits, re-alignments and the creation of new parties and coalitions. Most 
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of these have taken place among and between opposition parties, while, by contrast, 
the governing DPS-SDP coalition has remained relatively stable. Again, political 
change has emanated from within the system, rather than through the mechanism 
of democratic elections. The DPS remains the dominant party in the country, a fact 
made clear by their victories in the March 2009 parliamentary elections and the May 
2010 local elections, and there seems little chance that that will change in the near 
future. Given this, what, if anything, can anything new be expected of the Lukšić-
led government? The composition of the new cabinet is suggests that while there is a 
symbolic change at prime ministerial level, there is little substantial change beneath it. 
Lukšić seems like a breath of fresh air, the personification of a new approach; engaging 
with the opposition, trade unions and the NGO sector. But the new prime minister is 
surrounded by Djukanović loyalists, and he will have only limited room for manoeuvre 
and limited scope for forging an independent policy.
Problematically, there is little challenge to the dominance of the DPS. The opposition 
remains relatively fragmented, although they proved capable of working together in 
the May 2010 local elections. The coalition-building that took place prior to those 
elections will almost certainly continue and, if it proves durable (which is by no means 
assured), it could present a challenge at the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 
2013. However, any coalition is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain, and 
the SNP may be that weak link. They have, after all, a strong base of support and are 
much closer to the DPS than other opposition parties. It may seem remote now, in 
light of the creation of a new government, but should Lukšić pursue policies that create 
conflict within the DPS, the party could split again. In such circumstances, the SNP 
could be a pivotal factor in the creation of a ‘reformed’ DPS or a new political party.
In the final analysis, however, Montenegro has made significant progress since the May 
2006 referendum. The tensions surrounding it were very real, and conflict (even if only 
of a low intensity) was a real possibility. The country faced significant challenges in the 
first years of its independence, challenges that could have proved insurmountable. Yet, 
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five years hence, the problems that seemed so acute in 2006 have been largely overcome. 
Montenegro has consolidated. Yet, there is no room for complacency; myriad challenges 
lie ahead, and while the foundations have been laid for Montenegro’s European future, 
there is much yet to be done before that future is secured.
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Appendix I: Montenegrin 
Parliamentary Election Results, 
September 2006*
Party/Coalition Votes % of vote Seats
Coalition for a European Montenegro (DPS-SDP) 164,737 48.62 39
Serbian List 49,730 14.68 12 
SNP–NS–DSS Coalition 47,683 14.07 11
Movement for Changes (PZP) 44,483 13.13 11
Liberal-Bosniak Coalition (LS-BS) 12,748 3.76 3
Democratic Alliance in Montenegro (DSCG) 4,373 1.29 0 (1)**
Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) 3,693 1.09 0 (1)**
Civic List (GL) 2,906 0.86 0
Albanian Alternative (AA) 2,656 0.78 0 (1)**
League of Communists of Montenegro (SKCG) 2,343 0.69 0
New Democratic Force (FORCA) 2,197 0.65 0
Democratic Party of Montenegro (DSCG) 1,286 0.38 0
Total 338,833 100 76 (+3) 
Note: The electoral threshold in Montenegro is 3%, meaning that electoral lists (be they political parties, 
coalitions or civic groups) receiving under this percentage of the total votes cast, are crossed out, and the MPs 
within the assembly are split amongst the remaining lists. 
*All election data gathered from Republička izborna komisija Crne Gore, Podgorica.
**Albanians in Montenegro are subject to a special arrangement which guarantees them 3 seats in the Assembly.
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Appendix II: Montenegrin 
Parliamentary Election Results, 
January 2009*
Party/Coalition Votes % of vote Seats
European Montenegro (DPS-SDP) 168,290 51.94 47
Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP) 54,545 16.83 16
New Serb Democracy (NOVA/NSD) 29,885 9.22 8
Movement for Changes (PzP) 19,546 6.03 5
People’s Coalition (DSS-NS) 9,448 2.92 0
For a Different Montenegro (LS-DC) 8,777 2.71 0
Party of Pensioners and 
Disabled People in Montenegro 
7.691 2.37 0
Democratic Union of Albanians 4,747 1.46 0 (1)*
Serb National List 4,291 1.32 0
‘Together As One: Bosniaks & Muslims’ 3,498 1.08 0
FORCA 2,939 1.19 0 (1)*
Albanian List (DS-AA) 2,898 0.89 0 (1)*
‘Albanian Coalition – Perspective’ 2,619 0.81 0 (1)* 
Fatherland Serbia Party 2,446 0.75 0
Montenegrin Communists 1,594 0.49 0
Party of Democratic Prosperity 805 0.25 0
Total 323,990 100 76 (+5)
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Appendix III: Montenegrin 
Presidential Election Results, 
April 2008*
Candidate Party Votes % of vote
Filip Vujanović Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) 171,118 51.89
Andrija Mandić Serbian List (SL) 64,473 19.55
Nebojša Medojević Movement for Changes (PzP) 54,874 16.64
Srdjan Milić Socialist People’s Party (SNP) 39,316 11.92
Total 336,900 100.00
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Appendix IV: Montenegrin 
Census Results 2003
Nationality Number % of Population
Montenegrin 267.449 43.16
Serbian 198.414 31.99
Bosniak 48.184 7.7
Albanian 31.163 5.03
Muslim 24.625 3.97
Croat 6.811 1.1
Roma 2.601 0.42
Others 8.367 1.2
Did not declare 27.715 4.1
No data 10.532 1.6
Source: ‘Rezultati popisa u Crnoj Gori’, Monstat, December 2003.
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Assessing Five YeArs oF 
Montenegro’s independence
Change, Continuity 
and Consolidation:
In 2006, Montenegro broke away from its union with Serbia and declared 
independence. At the time, many observers were sceptical about its future. The 
smallest of the six republics that made up Yugoslavia, there were real questions 
about its ability to survive on its own. Five years later, what progress has it made? 
This paper assesses the key political developments that have taken place since 
independence and analyses how the political landscape in Montenegro has evolved. 
It also examines the crucial question of how the political situation has shaped the 
wider framework of Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic integration process. Collectively, 
these factors have characterised Montenegro’s first years of independence; a period 
marked by an interesting mix of continuity, change and consolidation.
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